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STUDENT NOTES
CIVIL PROCEDURE - JURISIDCTION - THE
WEST VIRGINIA LONG-ARM STATUTE
In 1957 the West Virginia legislature enacted a statute which
provides that in certain instances foreign corporations would be
deemed to be doing business in this state for the purpose of service
of process.' In enacting this "long-arm" statute, West Virginia
joined many other states in taking advantage of the United States
Supreme Court's decisions that expanded the extent to which
states could exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents within
the limits of due process.2 However, upon comparing the jurisdic-
tion afforded by the West Virginia statute to that exercised under
other long-arm statutes, it becomes apparent that this state has
taken only limited advantage of the maximum jurisdiction allowed
under due process.
This situation is contrary to what should be the basic premise
behind any long-arm statute. It is in the best interests of the
residents of a state to provide the most effective and convenient
forum available for the enforcement of claims against nonresi-
dents. The limited reach of the West Virginia long-arm statute
denies the residents of this state such a forum and as a result they
are more often subject to the difficulty and expense of bringing
actions in foreign forums. Considering that all of our surrounding
states and many others have enacted comprehensive long-arm
statutes,3 this is an inequitable situation. It allows the residents of
this state to be subjected to the jurisdiction of other states without
a reciprocal right to bring action in their own state. Therefore, it
is the position of this note that this state should extend its jurisdic-
tional authority to the full extent allowed by due process.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-15 (1975 Replacement Volume).
2 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Travelers Health Ass'n. v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.210 (Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 6, § 6-102
(Supp. 1976), §§ 6-103, 104 (1974); OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.381, .382, .385
(Baldwin 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 8301 to 8311 (Supp. 1974-75); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8-81.1 to -81.5 (Supp. 1976).
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In approaching this problem, it must be remembered that the
power of a state to exercise personal jurisdiction depends upon: (1)
whether there is statutory authority to assert jurisdiction and (2)
whether the exercise of that jurisdiction will violate due process
rights.' Thus, in trying to achieve full due process jurisdiction,
there must be a legislative decision to that effect 5 and this decision
necessarily entails a determination of what is allowed by due pro-
cess and how this may be incorporated into a long-arm statute. In
order to deal with these problems, this note will explore the devel-
opment of personal jurisdiction within due process limits. Also, the
comparative ability of the West Virignia long-arm act to assert
effective jurisdiction will be examined. Finally, to the extent that
this comparison suggests a need for reform, alternative long-arm
jurisdiction will be explored.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENTS
AND THE LIMITATIONS OF DUE PROCESS
In Pennoyer v. Neff, I the United States Supreme Court deter-
mined that the jurisdiction of a state is necessarily restricted by
its territorial boundaries and as a result a state could only exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when he was personally
served within the state or voluntarily appeared there to defend
suit. This definition of state power proved to be severely limited
when applied to corporations because of their fictional status as
legal entities existing only in the state of their incorporation. In
order to satisfy the requirements of Pennoyer, the theories of
"consent" and "presence" were developed.' A corporation con-
ducting business in a state was deemed to have established its
"presence" there or to have impliedly "consented" to the juris-
diction of the forum state.' The consent theory was also applied
in certain circumstances to individuals where there was a "special
state interest" involved
See Beaty v. M. S. Steel Co., 401 F.2d 157 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1049 (1968); Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948).
5 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Bowman v. Curt
G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1966) (providing that a state does not have to
exercise or provide for jurisdiction to the extent due process allows).
6 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (hereinafter cited as Pennoyer).
7 See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Per-
sonam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CH. L. REv. 569, 578-582 (1958).
'Id.
Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (regulation of securities);
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As interstate commerce expanded and corporate activities in-
creased, these theories proved to be unsatisfactory and thus, in
1945, the Court in the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, ,o abandoned the requirement of territorial power. The
Court there held that a foreign corporation which had systemati-
cally and continuously employed a force of salesmen to solicit busi-
ness within a state could be sued in that state. In reaching this
decision, the Court announced a new test which stated that due
process requires that a nonresident defendant have certain
"minimum contacts" in the forum state so that the maintenance
of the suit does not "offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice'.""
While this new test represented a considerable expansion over
the territorial power concept, it was a general one which would
have to be developed on a case by case basis.'2 The Court did,
however, establish broad outlines based on the number and kind
of contacts with the state and whether or not the cause of action
arose out of these contacts.' 3 In cases where the action arose out of
contacts which were systematic and continuous, the Court found
that the assertion of jurisdiction was always proper.'4 There was
with equal certainty the assumption that when there was a single
contact and the cause of action did not arise out of that contact,
the assertion of jurisdiction would be improper." The situation of
an isolated contact out of which a cause of action arose provided a
more difficult problem, and the court determined that jurisdiction
was proper only in some circumstances depending on the "nature
and quality" of the act." Another gray area arose when there was
continuous activity in the state but the cause of action did not
arise out of that activity. In that situation "substantial" connec-
tions were required to justify a suit.'7
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (regulation of nonresident motorists).
" 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (hereinafter cited as International Shoe).
" Id. at 316.
" Id. at 319.
, For a more detailed discussion of these outlines see Comment, International
Shoe and Long-Arm Jurisdiction - How About Pennsylvania?, 8 DUQ. L. REV. 319,
320-26 (1970).
14 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
Id.
Id. at 318.
, Id. See also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)
(nonresident sued a Philippine corporation in Ohio on a cause of action that did
[Vol. 79
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These distinctions as to the kind of activity necessary for juris-
diction were expanded upon in McGee v. International Life Insur-
ance Co. 18 There the Court upheld a resident's right to assert per-
sonal jurisdiction in a cause of action arising out of a life insurance
policy with a nonresident insurance company whose sole contact
with the forum state was its single life insurance contract with the
resident plaintiff. The Court found that only a single contract with
the forum state would satisfy due process requirements if the suit
was based on a contract which had a substantial connection with
the forum state.'9 Here it was noted that the forum state had a
manifest interest in providing an effective means of recovery for
insured residents when their insurers refused to pay claims.
This trend of expanding state jurisdiction evidenced in Mc Gee
was not to continue unchecked. In Hanson v. Denckla,0 the Court
made this clear by refusing to allow the State of Florida to gain
jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee whose only contact with the
forum was the mailing of trust income to a settlor who had become
a Florida resident after making the trust agreement. The Court
stated that it was a mistake to assume that this trend of expanding
state jurisdiction "heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions
on the personal jurisdiction of state courts" and that the minimum
contacts doctrine still imposed certain restrictions."1 Thus the
Court held that "[lit is essential in each case that there be some
act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum state..."I'
The decision in Hanson was the last significant opinion of the
Supreme Court on personal jurisdiction. Yet, there has been a
multitude of state and federal decisions arising from state long-
arm statutes enacted upon the authority of International Shoe and
not arise there nor was it related to the defendants activities there).
" 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (hereinafter cited as McGee).
19 Id. at 223. Despite the fact that McGee dealt with an insurance contract, it
is generally recognized that jurisdiction may be predicated upon any type of single
contract. See, e.g., Shepler v. Korbut, 33 Mich. App. 411, 190 N.W.2d 281 (1971);
State ex rel. Coral Pools, Inc. v. Knapp, 147 W. Va. 704, 131 S.E.2d 81 (1963). The
contract need not be a commercial one. See also Van Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg,
241 Md. 154, 215 A.2d 812, cert. denied 385 U.S. 833 (1966) (marriage separation
agreement).
2* 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (hereinafter cited as Hanson).
" Id. at 251.
12 Id. at 253.
4
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its progeny. These decisions reflect the difficulty that state courts
have had in defining the limits of personal jurisdiction, particu-
larly in the context of the single contact situation.n In the next
section this note will attempt to see how West Virginia has faired
in defining these limits and applying them on a case by case basis.
H. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN WEST VIRGINIA
The West Virginia long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction
over foreign corporations by service of process received by the Sec-
retary of State." The statute provides that jurisdiction may be
exercised:
(a) if such corporation makes a contract to be performed,
in whole or in part, by any party thereto, in this State, (b) if
such corporation commits a tort in whole or in part in this
State, or (c) if such corporation manufactures, sells, offers for
sale or supplies any product in a defective condition and such
product causes injury to any person or property within this
State notwithstanding the fact that such corporation had no
agents, servants or employees or contacts within this State at
the time of said injury.?
In examining these provisions of the West Virginia statute it
is apparent that the act has certain basic limitations. The most
obvious limitation is that it only applies to corporations, and this
is so despite the fact that International Shoe and the minimum
contacts analysis generally has been held equally applicable to
individuals.2 1 In addition, regardless of what contacts a corporate
11 The single contact situation includes not only the single contract as in
McGee, but also the single tort. While the Supreme Court has never directly de-
cided the issue, Justice Goldberg acting as a single justice in Rosenblatt v. Ameri-
can Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1 (1965) found, without deciding the issue, that the
logic of International Shoe and McGee supports the "long-arm" statutes that apply
to a single "tortious act." See also Etzler v. Dillie & McGuire Mfg. Co., 249 F. Supp.
1, 5 (W.D. Va. 1965).
21 In discussing the extent of contact a nonresident must have before jurisdic-
tion may be asserted within due process limits, this note will not deal with the
separate issue of what kind of service of process is permissible under due process.
2 W. VA. CODE ANN § 31-1-15 (1975 Replacement Volume).
21 While International Shoe, McGee and Hanson concerned only corporations,
the language of these opinions makes no distinction between nonresident individu-
als and foreign corporations. In McGee, the Court specifically spoke of a trend
toward expanding jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. 355
U.S. 220, 222 (1957). See Smithers, Virginia's "Long Arm" Statute: An Argument
[Vol. 79
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defendant has that will satisfy due process requirements, the stat-
ute can only be applied when its enumerated conditions of a con-
tract to be performed in the state or a tort or products liability
injury exist.27 Finally, the statute only refers to causes of action
arising within the state. This excludes the situation mentioned in
International Shoe of jurisdiction exercised over a nonresident with
substantial and continuing contact with the state on a cause of
action arising outside the state2
Even with its limited provisions, the language of the West
Virginia long-arm statute is such that it can encompass the major-
ity of commonly litigated problems. However, it will be discovered
that often the statute's effectiveness has been further limited by
the conservative interpretation of the West Virginia Supreme
Court regarding constitutionally acceptable minimum contacts. In
order to judge the effect of the court's interpretation and the lim-
ited language of the West Virginia long arm statute, it is best to
examine the few cases that have dealt with the statute9 in the
context of the statute's enumerated conditions and then compare
these cases to the authority of other jurisdictions.
The contract provision of the West Virginia statute has seldom
served as a basis of jurisdiction and it appears that the most sub-
stantial application of this provision occurred in State ex rel. Coral
Pools, Inc. v. Knapp." In this, the first decision of the court under
the long-arm act, jurisdiction was asserted over a foreign corpora-
tion whose only connection with the state was a single oral contract
that resulted from an interstate phone offer from the corporation
to the resident plaintiff. The court found that the oral contract fell
clearly within the statute and that sufficient minimum contacts
for Constitutionality of Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Individuals, 51 VA. L. REV.
712 (1965).
" Schweppes U.S.A. Ltd. v. Kiger, 214 S.E.2d 867, 871 (W. Va. 1975).
See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
Marietta Mfg. Co. v. Brad Foote Gear Works, Inc., 377 F.2d 889 (4th Cir.
1967); Abrams v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.W. Va. 1971); L. S. Good
& Co. v. H. Daroff & Sons, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 635 (N.D.W. Va. 1967); Harford v.
Smith, 257 F. Supp. 578 (N.D.W. Va. 1966); Mann v. Equitable Gas Co., 209 F.
Supp. 571 (N.D.W. Va. 1962); Schweppes U.S.A. Ltd. v. Kiger, 214 S.E.2d 867 (W.
Va. 1975); Chase v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 273 (W. Va. 1975); John W.
Lohr Funeral Home v. Hess & Eisenhardt Co., 152 W. Va. 723, 166 S.E.2d 141
(1969); Hodge v. Sands Mfg. Co., 151 W. Va. 133, 150 S.E.2d 793 (1966); State ex
rel. Corol Pools, Inc. v. Knapp, 147 W. Va. 704, 131 S.E.2d 81 (1963).
" 147 W. Va. 704, 131 S.E.2d 81 (1963) (hereinafter cited as Knapp).
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existed since the contract had a substantial connection with the
state. In so finding, the court emphasized the fact that since the
offer was accepted in this state, the contract was made in the state.
The holding in Knapp is important in several respects. It
seems to indicate a willingness by the court to apply a relatively
broad standard of minimum contacts3' at a time when most courts
required a more substantial connection with the forum, such as
physical presence of the defendant or his agent. This is surprising
when compared to the later decisions of the court under the act
where a much more conservative analysis is evidenced. The case
also serves as an example of the most commonly disputed situation
arising under any provision of a long-arm statute - the single act.
While it is generally agreed that repeated contact with a forum
state under a contract or contracts will satisfy minimum contact
requirements,32 there is a conflict as to when a single act by a
nonresident in the state in connection with a contract will be suffi-
cient. While the Knapp decision states that the place of contract-
ing is an important consideration in judging minimum contacts in
this situation, the cases dealing with this situation indicate that
many other factors may be relevant.
In analyzing which factors are important in the single contract
situation and in any single act or transaction situation, many
courts have employed a three step analysis which combines the
factors discussed in International Shoe, McGee and Hanson.33 This
analysis requires initially that a nonresident do some act or cause
a consequence in the forum state thus demonstrating that the
defendant has purposely availed himself of the privilege of acting
in the forum. In the contract situation, this requirement has been
most often satisfied when the nonresident or his agent has been
physically present within the state in relation to the contract, such
"' See Gavenda Bros., Inc. v. Elkins Limestone Co., 145 W. Va. 732, 743, 116
S.E.2d 910, 916 (1960), as an example of a more liberal attitude of the court as it
endorsed the public policy behind the expansive Illinois long-arm statute, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
32 Abrams v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.W. Va. 1971); L. S. Good
& Co. v. H. Daroff & Sons, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 635 (N.D.W. Va. 1967).
' See, e.g., Doyn Aircraft, Inc. v. Wylie, 443 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1971); South-
ern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968); Kourkene
v. American B.B.R., Inc., 313 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1963). But see Comment, Long.
Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69
MICH. L. REV. 300, 312 (1970), where the three step analysis is criticized as being
too restrictive.
[Vol. 79
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as in its negotiation and solicitation,34 or in the inspection of goods
to be purchased.n The requirement may also be satisfied without
physical presence where a contract is solicited by phone or mail36
or where goods have been shipped into the state pursuant to a
contract.37 Even the simple making of a contract with a resident
of the forum state will suffice when it is reasonably foreseeable that
the contract will have commercial consequences in the forum
state." The second step of the analysis requires that, in all cases,
the cause of action arise out of the contract.
The final step of the analysis requires that the exercise of
jurisdiction over the nonresident be consonant with the due pro-
cess tenets of "fair play" and "substantial justice." The kinds of
considerations involved in this step are those normally associated
with the forum non conveniens doctrine. 9 Such considerations are
often the ability of the nonresident to defend the suit in the forum
state, whether the evidence and witnesses are in the forum state
and the relationship between the size of the claim and the ability
of the resident to bring suit in a foreign forum." Considering these
factors, many courts have distinguished between nonresident buy-
ers and nonresident sellers with the courts more freely exercising
jurisdiction over the nonresident seller.'
34 See, e.g., Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Dateline Electric Co., 461 F.2d 897 (7th Cir.
1972).
*1 See, e.g., Knopp Forge Co. v. Jawtiz, 37 Ill. App. 2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76
(1972).
U See, e.g., Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2nd Cir. 1967).
3' See, e.g., Ajax Realty Corp. v. J. F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1972).
However, courts will frequently decline jurisdiction where the shipment of goods is
the sole contact with the forum state. The leading case espousing this view is
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
In-Flight Devices, Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir.
1972) (foreign corporation made a contract outside the forum state with a resident
corporation for the manufacture of a substantial number of goods in the forum
state). See also Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Electronics Corp., 417 F.2d 365 (8th
Cir. 1969) (sale of goods by a foreign corporation to resident corporation was held
to be a foreseeable impact on the forum state's commerce).
3, The forum non conveniens doctrine is simply the principle that a court may
resist the imposition on its jurisdiction if it is an inappropriate forum for trial. Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
40 These factors are mentioned in McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,
223, 224 (1957); L. D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768, 775
(9th Cir. 1959).
1, See, e.g., In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th
Cir. 1972); Oswalt Indus., Inc. v. Gilmore, 297 F. Supp. 307 (D. Kan. 1969). But
8
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Given the many kinds of acts and the nature of the considera-
tions that have satisfied the three step analysis or other minimum
contacts approaches, it is clear that the West Virginia court could
exercise its jurisdiction in many instances. However, the court will
be limited in dealing with many commercial situations since the
West Virginia statute does not apply in the absence of a contract.2
Thus, actions arising from the reliance on a contract that never
occurred, or failed, or which arose from quasi-contract situations,
would not be covered under the act.
In contrast to the more limited ability of the statute to deal
with commercial activity, the statute provides a comprehensive
basis for actions based on tortious injury and products liability.
Unfortunately, the extent to which these provisions have been ap-
plied has been limited by a much more conservative minimum
contacts analysis than evidenced in earlier decisions under the act.
The first applications of the statute's tort provision were by
federal courts43 prior to any decision by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals. In Mann v. Equitable Gas Co.,4 where an action
was sought on an injury resulting from a gas line negligently manu-
factured out of state, the court refused jurisdiction over the nonres-
ident manufacturer. The decision was based on the finding that
the statute did not apply because the operative facts constituting
the tort occurred outside the state,45 and, even if the tort was held
to occur at the place of injury, the nonresident corporation lacked
the requisite minimum contacts since no contact with the state
was alleged in the complaint. Four years later, the same court
found both the tort and contract provisions of the act were applica-
see Colony Press, Inc. v. Fleeman, 17 Ill. App. 3d 14, 308 N.E.2d 78 (1974); Fourth
Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus. Inc., 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732
(1962).
12 Marietta Mfg. Co. v. Brad Foote Gear Works, Inc., 377 F.2d 889 (4th Cir.
1967). See also John W. Lohr Funeral Home v. Hess & Eisenhardt Co., 152 W. Va.
723, 166 S.E.2d 141 (1969) (a denial of resident purchaser's claim for jurisdiction
over a foreign manufacturer who failed to fill an order from a resident who had
contracted with the manufacturer for the purchaser's requirements).
" In diversity or other actions in federal courts, the law of the forum state, as
limited by due process, determines the amenability of a nonresident to suit in that
state. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2nd Cir. 1963).
4 209 F. Supp. 571 (N.D.W. Va. 1962) (hereinafter cited as Mann).
"' Other decisions so holding are Marsh v. Tillie Lewis Foods, Inc., 254 F.
Supp. 490 (D.S.D. 1966); O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d
568 (1963).
[Vol. 79
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ble in Harford v. Smith.4" In Harford, the court granted jurisdic-
tion where injuries were sustained when a gas stove manufactured
by a nonresident corporation exploded in the state. The court
ignored Mann's rejection of a place of injury theory and distin-
guished the case from Mann because of the existence of minimum
contacts in the defendant's advertising, soliciting and making di-
rect mail contact in the state.
The confusion resulting from these decisions was soon cleared
by the West Virginia court in Hodge v. Sands Manufacturing Co.47
In that decision, the court refused to exercise jurisdiction over a
nonresident manufacturer and one of its component part manufac-
turers where their water heater exploded in the state. The court
refused jurisdiction because it did not find minimum contacts to
exist since the water heater had been sold to an independent dealer
in the state, and neither defendant had engaged in any persistent
course of conduct of selling such heaters or other products in the
state. While the court did not find minimum contacts, it did con-
firm the place of injury theory of Harford by finding that a tort is
committed in the jurisdiction in which the injury occurs."
The Hodge decision was unfortunate since it specifically re-
jected the line of authority initiated by Gray v. American Radiator
and Standard Sanitary Corp.,4" which held that due process is
satisfied where it is found that a nonresident seller or manufac-
turer has so placed his goods in the stream of commerce that it is
reasonably foreseeable that a product would be marketed in the
forum state." This stream of commerce theory seems to be the
' 257 F. Supp. 578 (N.D.W. Va. 1966) (hereinafter cited as Harford).
' 151 W. Va. 133, 150 S.E.2d 793 (1966).
" It is well accepted that the situs of the injury is where the tort occurred. See,
e.g., Andersen v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 135 N.W.2d 639 (1965);
Dallas v. Whitney, 118 W. Va. 106, 188 S.E. 766 (1936).
41 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). See, e.g., Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970); Everly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th
Cir. 1969); Sheridan v. Cadet Chemical Corp., 25 Conn. Supp. 17, 195 A.2d 766
(1963); Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d
824 (1963).
The theory is stated in Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp.
645, 649 (N.D. Ill. 1965):
When a manufacturer voluntarily chooses to sell his product in a way in
which it will be sold from dealer, to dealer, transferred from hand to
hand and transported from state to state, he cannot reasonably claim
that he is surprised at being held to answer in any state for the damage
the product causes.
10
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approach taken by many courts and is a necessary one if courts are
going to provide a reasonable forum for products liability actions
in an economy in which a manufacturer rarely deals directly with
the consumer. The West Virginia legislature apparently recognized
this fact when it added the products liability language to the long-
arm statute in 1969.1' The language of the 1969 amendment may
even go beyond the stream of commerce theory by embracing the
broader proposition expressed by some courts that a manufacturer
is amenable to suit wherever his product causes injury."
However, this conclusion has not been accepted by the West
Virginia court which recently refused to apply the West Virginia
long-arm statute to a component part manufacturer. In Chase v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 13 where fatal injury allegedly resulted from
a negligently designed camper door manufactured by a foreign
corporation, the court was asked whether the foreign corporation
that manufactured the camper itself could bring in the door manu-
facturer as a third party defendant. The court, still relying on
Hodge, refused to exercise jurisdiction over the component manu-
facturer finding that it "[h]ad not manufactured, sold, offered for
sale or supplied a product which caused injury to a person or prop-
erty in this State. . ." ' This holding was a narrow construction
of the long-arm statute and represents a substantial limitation
since it precludes jurisdiction over any component-part manufac-
turer. Most courts have not been so restrictive with such manufac-
turers, but have instead examined their activity in terms of the
stream of commerce theory to see if the injury in the forum state
was foreseeable.5
5, The 1969 amendment added the following language:
(c) if such corporation manufactures, sells, offers for sale or sup-
plies any product in a defective condition and such product causes injury
to any person or property within this State notwithstanding the fact that
such corporation had no agents, servants or employees or contacts within
this State at the time of said injury.
Acts of the 59th W. Va. Leg. ch. 20, Reg. Sess. (1969).
11 See, e.g., Andersen v. National Presto Indus. Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 135 N.W.2d
639 (1965); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
211 S.E.2d 273 (W. Va. 1975).
" Id. at 276.
See, e.g., Dawkins v. White Products Corp., 443 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1971);
Gill v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 312 F. Supp. 916 (D.N.H. 1970).
[Vol. 79
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ll. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
In reviewing the ability of West Virginia courts to exercise
jurisdiction over nonresidents under the present long-arm statute,
it has been found that the application of the act is limited by both
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' conception of neces-
sary minimum contacts and by the language of the statute itself.
As far as the court is concerned, it can only be hoped that it will
adopt a more expansive due process analysis, particularly in pro-
ducts liability situations. However, the legislature can act to pro-
vide a more comprehensive statute which deals with the possible
jurisdictional problems, consistent with the intent to assert juris-
diction to the fullest extent allowed by constitutional due process.
More specifically, West Virginia needs a statute that will provide
jurisdiction for both individuals and corporations and one that will
be specific enough to provide direction for the courts without limit-
ing the courts when they find due process requirements are met.
Keeping these considerations in mind, the question then becomes
what is the best language to be employed to achieve these goals.
One method of defining the jurisdictional limits of the courts
has been simply to have a statute that states that the courts may
exercise jurisdiction to the limits permitted by constitutional due
process. A few states have adopted this approach-" and have
thereby avoided the problem of trying to statutorily categorize the
applicable situations. However, this approach provides no direc-
tion or guidance for the courts in an area of the law already plagued
by uncertainty and vague distinctions. Rather than serve as the
sole language of a statute, it would appear that the language of
such "due process" statutes would serve as a useful addition to a
more specific statute" so as to allow the statute to be flexible
enough to deal with new situations and developing standards.
"' CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 410.10 (Deerings 1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-5-
33 (1969).
1, An example of this is in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8309(b) (Supp. 1974-75)
where, in addition to the enumerated jurisdictional situations of § 8309(a), the
subsection states:
Exercise of full constitutional power over foreign corporations - in addi-
tion to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section the jurisdiction and
venue of the Commonwealth shall extend to all foreign corporations and
the powers exercised by them to the fullest extent allowed under the
Constitution of the United States.
12
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Approved in 1962, the Uniform Interstate and International
Procedure Act 5 has become the leading model for states adopting
long-arm statutes. 9 The language of the Uniform Act is quite com-
prehensive as the drafters of the Act attempted to define the kind
of situations that have been recognized by the courts as suggesting
a basis for jurisdiction." The Act applies to both individuals and
corporations"' and contains provisions for handling service of pro-
cess and other procedural problems. Considering the increasing
-" 13 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 279 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as the Uniform
Act].
59 Jurisidictions adopting the Uniform Act include: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-2501
to -2507 (Supp. 1975); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 13-401 to -434 (1973); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 223A, §§ 1 to 14 (1974); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.701 to .735 (1976
Replacement Volume); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 12-1701.01 to -1706.04 (Supp.
1975-76); V. I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4901 to 4905 (1967). Also adopting similar
provisions: Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.210 (Supp. 1976); LA. Rlv. STAT. ANN. §§
13.3201 to .3207 (1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 6, § 6-102 (Supp. 1976), §§ 6-103, -104
(1974); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-535 to -541 (1975); N. Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 302 to
320 (McKinney 1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.381, .382, .385 (Baldwin 1975);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-235 to -240 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-81.1 to -81.5
(Supp. 1976).
W Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act § 1.03, 13 UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. 279, 285 (1975):
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim of relief] arising
from the person's
(1) transacting any business in this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or things in this state;
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside
this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed or services rendered, in this state; (or)
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state;
[or
(6) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within
this state at the time of contracting].
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section,
only a [cause of action] [claim of relief] arising from acts enumerated
in this section may be asserted against him.
1, Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act § 1.01, 13 UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. 281, 283 (1975):
As used in this Article, "person" includes an individual, his executor,
administrator, or other personal representative, or a corporation, partner-
ship, association or any other legal or commercial entity, whether or not
organized under the laws of this state.
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number of adopting jurisdictions, it also has the added advantage
of a large body of authority on the application of the act.-"
In comparing the advantages of the Uniform Act's language to
the West Virginia statute, the main difference is the "transacting
any business" provision of the Uniform Act"3 which its drafters
intended to have an "expansive interpretation."" This provision
was broadly drafted to deal with tort, contract and quasi-contract
situations and thus would allow the assertion of jurisdiction over
nonresidents in many commercial situations that are not covered
by the West Virginia long arm statute. 5 The Uniform Act also has
a contract provision,66 but it is more limited than its West Virginia
counterpart in that it applies only to "contracting to supply serv-
ices or things in the State." This language is such that it would
exclude nonresident buyers, and it seems to reflect the traditional
bias of courts in this situation. 6 The West Virginia long-arm stat-
ute seems to provide a more flexible approach in that it does not
exempt nonresident buyers per se but allows the courts to decide
when the exercise over such a buyer would violate due process.
While the Uniform Act allows a more comprehensive coverage
of commercial situations, it is more limited in its coverage of tort
and products liability situations. This is reflected in the require-
ment of regular business or substantial revenues in the situations
of tortious activity outside the state. This additional requirement
is unduly restrictive considering the wide acceptance of the stream
of commerce test and the increasing number of products liability
actions. Also, the vagueness of terms such as "substantial reve-
nues" represents an application problem and it is difficult to com-
prehend just why the Uniform Act placed such a limitation on its
tort provision and not the contracting provision, given that courts
generally tend to require fewer contacts in personal injury situa-
tions."
2 See generally Woods, The Uniform Long-Arm Act in Arkansas: The Far Side
of Jurisdiction, 22 ARK. L. REv. 627 (1969); Comment, Personal Jurisdiction over
Nonresidents - The Louisiana "Long-Arm" Statute, 40 TUL. L. REv. 366 (1966);
Note, The Virginia "Long-Arm" Statute, 51 VA. L. REv. 719 (1965).
13 See note 60 supra.
11 Commissioners' Comment, 13 UNFoRm LAWS ANN. 281, 285 (1975).
'3 See text following text accompanying note 42 supra.
', See note 60 supra.
' See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
'3 See note 60 supra.
" See, e.g., Newman v. Fleming, 331 F. Supp. 973, 974 (S.D. Ga. 1971), where
14
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The Act also enumerates two other instances upon which ju-
risdiction can be based. The insurance provision"0 is a recognition
of the well-defined state interest in such matters as announced in
the McGee decision. Yet this provision is unnecessary in West
Virginia and in many other states that already have more explicit
provisions providing for the exercise of jurisdiction in their insur-
ance statutes.7 The other provision allowing actions based on an
interest in, use or possession of real property 2 is a seldom used
provision and the extent of its application is uncertain. It seems
this provision could be used in actions arising from personal injury
on real property owned by nonresidents73 and also eliminate the
necessity for in rem actions to quiet title to land."
In addition to these provisions under which a cause of action
may arise in a state, the Act also has a provision for general juris-
diction which does not require a connection between the activity
of the defendant in the state and the cause of action." Such juris-
diction may be based on domicile, place of organization, or princi-
pal place of business. Like the West Virginia statute, it does not
encompass the situation of asserting jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent with substantial contacts with the forum state in a cause of
action arising outside the state.76
the court stated:
It is easier to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident tort feasor than over
a nonresident wrongdoer in fields other than torts. In the latter instancejurisdiction is posted under the statute on the defendant's transacting
any business in this State... (citation omitted) and in such cases Due
Process must be satisfied by the existence of "minimum contacts" of the
nonresident in the state in which he is sued ... Jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents in tort actions carries no such impediments.
10 See note 60 supra.
11 See, e.g., W. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 33-4-12,13 (1975 Relacement Volume); N.Y.
INS. LAw § 59-a(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
72 See note 60 supra.
11 See Gearhart v. Pulakos, 207 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Pa. 1962) dealing with PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (Supp. 1976).
7, See Note, Jurisdiction in New York: A Proposed Reform, 69 COL. L. REv.
1412, 1437 (1969).
" Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act § 1.02, 13 UNIFORM LAws
ANN. 281, 283 (1975):
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in,
organized under the laws of, or maintaining his or its principal place of
business in, this state as to any cause of action [claim of relief].
"' See note 17 and accompanying text supra. One approach to general jurisdic-
tion is contained in Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(1)(d) (Special Pamphlet 1976) which
[Vol. 79
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The final and very important feature of the Uniform Act is its
inclusion of a statutory statement of the forum non conveniens
doctrine. 7 Since the Act provides a very broad basis for the exer-
cise of jurisdiction, such a provision is valuable in preventing un-
just application of the Act and allowing plaintiffs leeway in their
choice of forum. Other statutes have approached the specific prob-
lem of abuse in the threat of suits of questionable jurisdiction
under such a broad statute by providing compensation for defen-
dants when a plaintiff fails to establish jurisdiction."
IV. CONCLUSION
A review of the statutory attempts to define personal juris-
diction reflects in part the difficulty in framing language that will
effectively encompass all the possible jurisdictional problems. In
this respect, the Uniform Act reflects the best kind of approach for
this state in providing some guidelines to its courts. However, as
previously noted, certain parts of the Act are unnecessarily restric-
tive and therefore the best solution would seem to be the incorpora-
tion of the provisions of the West Virginia statute and the removal
of the contracting and tort provision of the Uniform Act. In addi-
tion, the language of the "due process" statutes should be added
to allow the necessary flexibility in dealing with jurisdictional
problems and to provide a clear expression of the desire to exercise
jurisdiction to the limits of due process. A statute so constructed
would provide a comprehensive framework for the courts and an
expanded and convenient forum for the citizens of this state.
John A. Rollins
provides for jurisdiction over a nonresident when it "is engaged in substantial and
not isolated activities within this state, whether such activities are wholly inter-
state, intrastate, or otherwise."
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act § 1.05, 13 UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. 281, 291 (1975):
When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the
action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss
the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.
" MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.741 (1975-76 Replacement Volume); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 814.49 (Special Pamphlet 1976).
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